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The aim of the present study was to examine how visual emotional content could orches-
trate time perception. The experimental design allowed us to single out the share of
emotion in the specific processing of content-bearing pictures, i.e., real-life scenes. Two
groups of participants had to reproduce the duration (2, 4, or 6 s) of content-deprived
stimuli (gray squares) or differentially valenced content-bearing stimuli, which included neu-
tral, pleasant, and unpleasant pictures (International Affective Pictures Systems). Results
showed that the effect of content differed according to duration: at 2 s, the reproduced
duration was longer for content-bearing than content-deprived stimuli, but the difference
between the two types of stimuli decreased as duration increased and was not signif-
icant for the longest duration (6 s). At 4 s, emotional (pleasant and unpleasant) stimuli
were judged longer than neutral pictures. Furthermore, whatever the duration, the preci-
sion of the reproduction was greater for non-emotional than emotional stimuli (pleasant
and unpleasant). These results suggest a dissociation within content effect on timing in
the visual modality: relative overestimation of all content-bearing pictures limited to short
durations (2 s), and delayed overestimation of emotional relative to neutral pictures at 4 s,
as well as a lesser precision in the temporal judgment of emotional pictures whatever the
duration. Our results underline the relevance for time perception models to integrate two
ways of assessing timing in relationship with emotion: accuracy and precision.
Keywords: subjective time, content, emotional valence
INTRODUCTION
The literature on time perception contains many examples show-
ing that subjective time is greatly modulated by stimulus features.
Awell-known effect is the sensorymodality effect, i.e., the duration
of light and sound are judged differently. Evidence suggests that
auditory stimuli are judged longer and with greater precision than
visual stimuli of equal duration and these findings have generally
been interpreted in the framework of the scalar expectancy theory
(Gibbon et al., 1984; Penney and Tourret, 2005; Droit-Volet et al.,
2007; Noulhiane et al., 2008). This latter considers themodel of an
internal clock composed of three stages (1) a clock, i.e., a switch
opening at the beginning of a temporal event and closing at the
end of it, and a pacemaker generating pulses, (2) an accumulator
stocking pulses throughout the event, (3) a comparator comput-
ing the difference between the accumulated number of pulses in
working memory and a known duration in reference memory.
In this interpretation the modality effect is mainly located at the
clock stage: either because the pacemaker is faster in the auditory
modality (Wearden et al., 1998, 2006; Droit-Volet et al., 2004b), or
because the switchflickersmore in the visualmodality,more pulses
are accumulated with sounds than lights therefore auditory signals
seem longer than visual stimuli of equivalent duration (Collier and
Logan, 2000; Penney et al., 2000; Droit-Volet et al., 2007). Another
effect involves the sensory material filling the interval to be timed.
In the auditorymodality, a clear distinction ismadebetween empty
andfilled intervals: empty intervals are boundedby twobrief tones,
whereas filled intervals contain a continuous tonewith a beginning
and an end. Psychophysical studies indicate greater accuracy in the
timing of empty intervals (Rammsayer and Lima, 1991; Grondin,
1993). In addition, an increasing number of studies show that
numerical and spatial content can interfere with temporal esti-
mation, i.e., the number and the size of objects presented, or the
magnitude of task-irrelevant Arabic numbers appearing alongside
the stimulus modulate temporal judgment: the larger the number
or size, the longer the subjective duration (Roitman et al., 2007;
Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008; Oliveri et al., 2008; Bueti and
Walsh, 2009). A last feature of interest concerns the influence of
emotion on time perception.
A recent upsurge in the number of studies on the research of
time perception involves the probing of emotional stimuli on per-
ceived duration. These studies are probably inspired by everyday
knowledge of how in unpleasant situations we experience a slower
passage of time andoverestimate duration. This aspect of timeper-
ception, although part of everyday experience, had been neglected
in research over the past few decades. Only recently, a body of
evidence has been accumulated that is indicative of the intricate
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interplay between mood states and perceived duration. That is,
in psychophysical experiments auditory or visual stimuli that have
emotional content are often overestimatedwhen compared toneu-
tral stimuli. Studies using emotional visual stimuli such as facial
expressions or standardized emotional pictures from International
Affective Pictures Systems (IAPS, Lang et al., 1997), or standard-
ized emotional sounds from InternationalAffectiveDigital Sounds
(Bradley and Lang, 2007), indicate that duration perception is
highly dependent on emotional content. For instance, Angrilli
et al. (1997) proposed that emotion should not be considered as a
whole but as the combination of two factors: valence (i.e., the sign
of the emotional value) and intensity (i.e., the magnitude of the
emotional value). They designed a paradigm to disentangle the
effect of each component on time perception. Participants were
presented with pleasant and unpleasant pictures, both moderately
and highly arousing, alongside neutral pictures from the IAPS.
Pictures appeared for 2, 4, or 6 s. Participants were asked to per-
form a prospective timing task, either by indicating the perceived
duration of the picture presentation on an analog scale or by press-
ing a button to reproduce the duration. The analysis showed an
interaction between the two components of emotion regardless of
the timing method: duration of highly arousing pleasant pictures
was more underestimated than that of highly arousing unpleas-
ant pictures whereas duration of low-arousing pleasant pictures
was less underestimated than that of low-arousing unpleasant pic-
tures. However, no clear comparison with neutral stimuli, which
were used as fillers, was performed. Yet durations seem subjec-
tively different when timing stimuli with an emotional valence
than when timing stimuli with a neutral valence (e.g., Watts and
Sharrock, 1984; Droit-Volet et al., 2004a; Gil et al., 2007; Noul-
hiane et al., 2007). Overall, duration of all emotional pictures
is overestimated in comparison with that of neutral pictures. In
the framework of an internal pacemaker model researchers pos-
tulated that such emotional overestimation was mainly due to
an arousal-related acceleration of the internal pace in such situa-
tions. Thus overestimation is greater for highly arousing emotions
(for instance, angry faces are the most overestimated, followed by
happy and then sad faces; Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009). Attention
is also believed to impact timing: when attention is diverted from
the timing task, i.e., by a concurrent task or by emotional informa-
tion, it can delay the switch closure or produce a flickering which
both lead to a fewer number of accumulated pulses, and therefore
an underestimation of duration (Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009; Lui
et al., 2011). Although there is increasing interest in the subjective
experience of time and how it is modulated by emotional states,
to our knowledge, no study has compared stimuli with a content
(i.e., ecological stimuli, capturing some of the complexity of real-
life scenes) and those without (e.g., a picture of a square or a pure
tone). The existence of such a valence rating as neutral is some-
what controversial since it is not clear whether there is such an
emotional category or whether neutral stimuli simply have a low-
value valence or emotional intensity. The use of content-deprived
stimuli would provide a higher contrast between emotional and
non-emotional pictures – and thus would test the heuristic value
of timing model to determine the influence of emotion. Finally,
the impact of emotions on subjective time has been largely inves-
tigated in short-time scale subjective duration (i.e., sub-second
to second range), with most findings assuming an internal pace-
maker devoted to time. Studies using longer scales are still scarce
and do not systematically reinforce the internal pacemaker theory.
Alternative concepts favor the idea of duration-dependant timing
processes (Vierordt, 1868; Fraisse, 1984; Pöppel, 2009; Wittmann
and vanWassenhove, 2009).
The aim of the present study was to investigate how visual
emotional content influences time perception. By content we will
refer hereafter to the property for a picture to be realistic, i.e., to
contain representation of real-life objects or scenes, as opposed
to abstract signs or shapes. We used a temporal reproduction
paradigm involving stimuli of gradual content-related emotional
valence (content-deprived, content-bearing neutral, pleasant, and
unpleasant pictures). Two groups of participants were presented
with three standard durations (2, 4, and 6 s) of visual stimuli: (1)
Group 1 had to encode the duration of a content-deprived stimu-
lus, i.e., a gray square (no-content task); (2) Group 2 had to encode
the duration of content-bearing stimuli from the IAPS, i.e., pic-
tures rated for neutral, pleasant, and unpleasant emotional valence
(content task).We assumed that the duration of content-deprived
stimuli would be judged shorter than that of content-bearing stim-
uli. We also expected that neutral stimuli would be judged shorter
than emotional ones (positive or negative valence).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-four right-handed participants with no history of neu-
rological or psychiatric disorder volunteered for this study. Sev-
enteen performed the no-content task (Group 1) and seventeen
performed the content task (Group 2). All participants were
recruited in a population of young adults (age range 20 to 35 years
old) with a higher-education profile (Table 1). Two independent
groups assumed no interference between tasks. In accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki, all participants gave their informed
consent.
MATERIALS
The experiment was conducted using an IBM compatible com-
puter with a module controlling a shutter for the presentation of
visual stimuli. A specifically designed program controlled both
the presentation of the standard durations and the recording of
the participants’ responses (reproduced durations) with an accu-
racy of ±0.5ms. Stimuli were displayed in the center of the screen
against a black background, at a viewing distance of 0.5m.
The two tasks were adapted from previous studies using either
emotional content-bearing stimuli in the visual modality (Angrilli
et al., 1997), content-deprived stimuli in the visual modality or
emotional stimuli in the auditory modality (Noulhiane et al.,
2007, 2008). For the no-content task, the stimulus was a gray
Table 1 | Demographic data of participants.
Total number Age
(mean±SD, years)
Educational level
(mean±SD, years)
Group 1 17 (female, 8) 30.3±5 15.27±2.3
Group 2 17 (female, 8) 25.2±3 16.94±0.97
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10× 10 cm square of uniform luminance. For the content task,
36 pictures were selected from the IAPS (neutral: 1390, 5120,
5531, 5731, 7002, 7010, 7224, 7234, 7500, 7595, 7640, 7830; pleas-
ant: 1340, 1463, 1500, 2170, 4659, 4670, 5480, 5629, 5831, 8080,
8180, 8190; unpleasant: 1052, 1111, 1300, 3550, 6260, 7361, 9250,
9320, 9520, 9584, 9592, 9921), with three 12-item groups of dif-
ferent valence: pleasant (mean± SD= 7.57± 0.43), unpleasant
(2.84± 1.13), and neutral (5.57± 0.66). In both tasks, the dura-
tion reproduction paradigm involved three standard durations:
2, 4, and 6 s. During the no-content task each duration was pre-
sented 10 times in random order. During the content task, three
series were created by selecting four pictures from each group
(pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral), each picture appearing once
for each duration (2, 4, or 6 s), adding up to 36 (picture, duration)
stimuli in each list. Every participant was presented with the three
lists in pseudo-random order (108 trials in all).
PROCEDURE AND DESIGN
Each trial startedwith a stimulus presented for a randomly selected
standard duration. Participants were instructed to pay attention
to the duration of the stimulus in order to reproduce it. They
were told to avoid chronometric counting strategies. When the
stimulus disappeared, a gray square was displayed on the screen
in both tasks. Participants were asked to press the spacebar until
they judged that the time elapsed equaled the duration of the
picture presentation. The reproduced duration was recorded. A
random 2–3 s time gap was introduced after presentation of the
stimulus and during the inter-trial interval to prevent partici-
pants from having an implicit evaluation of the fixed time period.
Before the experiment, the participants were trained with five tri-
als using content-deprived or neutral pictures in the no-content
and content tasks respectively.
A control experimentwas performed to verify that the emotions
elicited by the pictures were stable over time for all durations used.
Stimuli were presented for 2, 4, and 6 s in random order. Ratings
of valence levels were collected from 12 young adults (six women,
aged 27± 3.43 years, and six men, aged 27± 3.77 years) who did
not participate in the main experiment. Participants were asked to
rate the self-assessment Manikin. Rated scores computed for the
three durations showed that subjective valence ratings matched
those of the IAPS, whatever the duration. Moreover, one-way
analyses of variance (ANOVA) performed on rated scores for each
valence with duration as a factor revealed no significant effect of
duration (all ps> 0.1). In sum, emotional valence does not vary
within this range of duration (Table 2).
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Accuracy of temporal performance was examined by computing
a T-corrected score with the following formula: [T-corrected= (T
estimated – T standard)/T standard]. Negative values indicate
that the reproduced duration was shorter than the standard, and
positive values indicate that it was longer. Precision of tempo-
ral performance was examined by computing the coefficient of
variation (CV) with the following formula: [CV= SDs of mean
reproduction time/mean reproduction time]. Paired t -tests were
performed to compare results across duration (3) and content (4).
Bonferroni corrections were applied for all analyses (p < 0.005).
Some results did not reach significance after correction (p < 0.05),
but they are still presented hereafter for discussion. These results
are however to be taken with caution.
RESULTS
T-CORRECTED
Student paired t -test scores (Figure 1) comparing durations
within the same content showed no difference in the no-content
task between 2, 4, and 6 s. Within the content-bearing stimuli on
the opposite, duration had a larger influence: all pairs of dura-
tions for each content condition were found significantly different
(all ps< 0.005), showing that 4 s-pictures were underestimated
with respect to 2 s-pictures, and 6 s-pictures were underestimated
with respect to both 2- and 4 s-pictures for all content conditions.
Overall, the longer the duration, the more underestimated it is.
Note that “underestimation” is used relatively between durations.
Table 2 | Rated scores from IAPS and those from 12 participants
computed for the three durations.
Duration/content IAPS score Rated score
(±SD)
Student test,
t (11); p
2 s Pleasant 7.58 6.22±0.62 2.02; NS
2 s Unpleasant 2.84 2.68±0.38 0.40; NS
2 s Neutral 5.57 4.73±0.66 1.22; NS
4 s Pleasant 7.58 6.29±0.54 2.22; NS
4 s Unpleasant 2.84 2.49±0.43 0.75; NS
4 s Neutral 5,57 4.62±0.77 1.17; NS
6 s Pleasant 7.58 6.31±0.60 1.94; NS
6 s Unpleasant 2.84 2.49±0.39 0.84; NS
6 s Neutral 5.57 4.72±0.81 1.01; NS
Student unpaired t-tests showed that scores were matched to IAPS scores what-
ever the duration. One-way ANOVAS performed for each valence with duration
as a factor showed no main effect of duration [pleasant: F(2,22)=2.22, p=0.13;
unpleasant: F(2,22)=0.94, p= 0.40; neutral: F(2,22)=0.65, p=0.53]: emotional
valence does not vary with duration. Rated scores for emotional valence.
FIGURE 1 |T-corrected (averaged across participants) for each standard
duration (2, 4, 6 s) in content-deprived (CD), neutral (NT), pleasant (P),
and unpleasant (U) conditions (error bars denote SR of the mean).
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Comparison of subjective durations to their actual standards
showed that 2 s-stimuli are overestimated, 4 s-stimuli are quite
accurately reproduced, and 6 s-stimuli are underestimated.
Student paired t -test scores between content conditions showed
that at 2 s, content-deprived stimuli were judged shorter than
neutral and pleasant content-bearing pictures [t (16)=−2.24,
p= 0.039 and t (16)=−2.18, p= 0.044, respectively]. There was
no difference between any of the content conditions at 2 s. At
4 s, there was no difference between content-deprived and any of
the content-bearing conditions. The neutral pictures were judged
shorter than the pleasant and the unpleasant ones [t (16)=−2.27,
p= 0.037 and t (16)=−2.12, p= 0.050, respectively]. No differ-
ence was found between pleasant and unpleasant pictures. Finally,
at 6 s, no difference between content-deprived and content-
bearing stimuli was found,nor between any of the content-bearing
conditions.
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION
Student paired t -tests (Figure 2) showed that CVs were smaller
at 6 s than at 2 s [t (16)= 4.85, p < 0.001] and at 4 s than at
2 s for unpleasant content only [t (16)= 4.38, p < 0.001]. Over
all contents the variability in response is however little influ-
enced by duration. Within duration, Student independent t -tests
showed that both content-deprived and content-bearing neutral
pictures had smaller CVs than pleasant and unpleasant pictures for
all durations (all ps< 0.001). No difference was found between
content-deprived and neutral content-bearing pictures. These
results showed that emotional pictures are judged with greater
variability than both content-deprived and neutral pictures, even
though the effect slowly diminishes with duration.
DISCUSSION
This study aimed at investigating the influence of visual emo-
tional content on time perception. Participants reproduced 2,
4, and 6 s durations in a task contrasting stimuli of vary-
ing emotional valence (content-bearing neutral, pleasant, and
unpleasant pictures) with content-deprived stimuli (gray squares).
FIGURE 2 | Coefficient of variation (averaged across participants) for
each standard duration (2, 4, 6 s) in content-deprived (CD) and
content-bearing [neutral (NT), pleasant (P), unpleasant (U)] conditions.
(Note error bars denote SR of the mean.)
The main results revealed that content affected both the accu-
racy and precision of the responses, and that this effect generally
diminished with time.
The measures of response accuracy (T-corrected) showed that
for a 2 s duration, all content-bearing stimuli were judged to last
longer than content-deprived ones; at 4 and 6 s, no more signif-
icant differences were found. In the framework of the internal
clock model, this content-related effect can be explained by an
attentional mechanism, a gray square capturing presumably less
attention than a content-bearing picture (Zakay, 2005). According
to this theory, enhanced attention paid to content-bearing pic-
tures would both fasten internal pacing and reduce the switch
flickering, making duration appear longer (Tse et al., 2004; Zakay,
2005; New and Scholl, 2009). This hypothesis is drawn in parallel
to the idea that emotional stimuli capture attentional resources
more easily than non-emotional ones (Droit-Volet and Meck,
2007). Our results revealed thus that not only emotional but more
generally content-bearing stimuli (even neutrally valenced) are
still more susceptible to capture attention than content-deprived
stimuli. Using a gray square, we did not investigate the specific
input of arousal. In future studies, this aspect would however need
to be examined by controlling the arousal level induced by the
presentation of content-deprived stimuli, for instance by mean
of physiological measures (e.g., skin conductance response, heart
rate). Additionally it should be noted that we chose to increase the
contrast between content-deprived and content-bearing stimuli
by using a simple one-color shape on the one hand, and complex
multicolored scenic pictures on the other hand. These features are
possible confounds that should be controlled for in future studies
by using for instance scrambled versions of the content-bearing
pictures as content-deprived stimuli. However in this context, the
relevance of the IAPS was to provide a battery of pictures rated for
emotion on a 1–9 linear scale (Lickert scale, 1= highly unpleas-
ant, 9= highly pleasant). “Neutral” pictures could thus still elicit
emotion in some participants (as reflected by interindividual vari-
ability, see Lang et al., 1997), whereas by using geometrical squares
we made sure that the stimuli elicited no emotion at all. Our
experimental design separated the content conditions into two
tasks executed by two different groups. Although this method-
ological point could be considered as a limit, this allowed us to
ensure the gray square during the reproduction phase did not
trigger any change in the pacemaker rate in the content-deprived
task as it could have if it had been contextualized by a majority of
content-bearing pictures, had the task been intermixed. Neverthe-
less, futures studies should control this aspect by having the same
participants perform the two tasks in a counter-balanced order,
or by intermixing content-deprived and content-bearing stimuli
with an equal number of trials in each condition.
Overall, we found that for any content-bearing stimulus, the
longer the duration, the shorter it is judged relative to the stan-
dard. This effect of duration is consistent with Vierordt’s (1868)
law; in a series of durations, the shortest are over-reproduced and
the longest are under-reproduced, reproduction of sample dura-
tions below and above themean of the series shifting progressively
toward the central value.Yet an interesting result is that the effect of
stimulus content on timeprocessing decreases as the duration to be
processed increases. We propose that the attentional effect drawn
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by content-bearing stimuli is limited in time: attention reflects the
ability to quickly allocate neural resources to the processing of a
relevant stimulation. Once the latter has been processed and the
appropriate answer has been produced, attentional level decreases,
leading the internal pace to return to its initial speed. This lower-
ing of content-induced activation with time could appear at odds
with the literature on activation and timing. Studies have gener-
ally reported a greater activation effect for longer than for shorter
times, the effect being multiplicative (Burle and Casini, 2001). As
in our previous study (Noulhiane et al., 2007), the present results
show the reverse pattern. However, most studies have tested the
influence of activation on the processing of durations shorter than
2 s, which was the lowest limit of our range. Moreover in the emo-
tional context, these studies have usually used facial emotional
expressions which constitute particular and unique stimuli for
humans as they involved social interactions and categorical emo-
tions (happiness, sadness, fear. . .). One may then posit that the
pacemaker rate increases within the duration of the content effect,
driven either by attention, arousal or complexity processing, and
then gradually returns to its baseline. Future studies in the sub-
second range using emotional scenes of real-life could clarify this
point.
Focusing on the emotional valence, our results surprisingly
show that emotion has a delayed effect on time reproduction:
at 2 s pleasant and unpleasant pictures were not judged differ-
ently from the neutral pictures; however at 4 s they were judged
longer than neutral pictures. At 6 s, no difference was observed
anymore. This result suggests that the difference in pace between
non-emotional and emotional scenes is not so big that we can
notice the difference after a 2 s-accumulation, but in 4 s the differ-
ence is bigger and reaches significance. As mentioned above, the
pace then progressively returns to its baseline level, so that at 6 s
no emotional-driven difference is noticeable again. This result dif-
fered from those reported by Lui et al. (2011), where the authors
introduced either an emotional or neutral picture from the IAPS
in-between the reference (S1) and the probe (S2) for durations
ranging from 1100 to 2300ms in a reproduction task. They found
that the duration of S2 was underestimated after an emotional
stimulus compared to a neutral stimulus, in agreement to an accel-
eration of the pacemaker triggered by emotion. However the pre-
sentation of the task-irrelevant picture happened 1300ms before
the presentation of S2, overruling any latency in the emotional
effect on the pacemaker, which could explain the presence of an
emotional effect below 2 s. It is also in contradictionwith what was
observed in the auditory modality within the same duration range
as in the present study,where the effect of emotion happened early
and decreased with time (Noulhiane et al., 2007). Such discrep-
ancy raises a broader issue about the relationship between timing,
emotion and sensory modality: namely, this questions whether
the intrinsically dynamic aspect of auditory stimuli facilitates the
extraction of emotional information in comparison to static visual
stimuli, and whether this would result in a delay of emotional
effect between auditory and visualmodalities. Future studies using
emotional cross-modality paradigm could refine this question.
The effect of stimuli content appeared also on the precision:
the CVs were slightly reduced with the length of duration for
any content. This effect could not be explained by the use of
chronometric counting since the high values reflect timing pro-
cessing (all CVs> 0.15; Wearden, 1991). Focusing on emotional
valence, the variability of judgments (CVs) was greater for emo-
tional (both pleasant and unpleasant) than non-emotional (both
neutral and content-deprived) pictures, for all three standard
durations. This suggests that emotional valence, and not content,
reduces the precision of temporal judgments. To respond appro-
priately to a picture, it is more important to decipher emotional
valence, and probably the nature of the conveyed emotion, than
to evaluate the exact duration of its presentation. In line with
the internal clock model, we hypothesize that emotion induces
a greater flickering of the switch. This flickering adds a ran-
dom factor that increases the variability of the final estimation.
Note that this does not contradict the fact that more pulses are
accumulated since, according to our attentional hypothesis, the
pacemaker is still running faster than for content-deprived stim-
uli. The findings obtained on precision finally support the recent
proposal that timing is a self-referential processing highly depen-
dent of our emotional state (Craig, 2009): the reduced precision
in the estimation of emotional stimuli duration may lie in the
extreme variability one may observe in the experience of emotion.
According to Craig’s (2009) model, our sense of time is based on
the succession of global emotional moments that are intrinsically
linked to the interoceptive information integrated in the insular
cortex. Considering that emotional stimuli are probably not equiv-
alent in the generation of emotion within an individual – even in
the same hedonic category – the internal state resulting in the
exposition of such stimuli may vary across trials. As a result time
estimates of such stimuli would also vary.
Finally, our data extend future perspective to elucidate mech-
anisms of time processing in link with content. For instance, the
temporal overestimation of content-bearing stimuli could reflect
a usual timing effect which has yet to be elucidated in current
neural timing models: the difference in number and complexity
between content-deprived and content-bearing pictures affects the
temporal judgement (Ornstein, 1969; Schiffman and Bobko, 1974;
Fraisse, 1984). Recent models propose that the passage of time
can be encoded in the evolving patterns of activity in neural net-
works (Buonomano andMauk,1994; Buonomano andMerzenich,
1995; Mauk and Buonomano, 2004; Buhusi and Meck, 2005; Kar-
markar and Buonomano, 2007; Ivry and Schlerf, 2008). This kind
of model is all the more exciting that so far the clock model has
found little support in physiology whereas this new approach is
based on neural dynamics. These models suggest that the dura-
tion assigned to a stimulus reflects the change in distribution of
neural activity following the stimulus presentation. To date, this
hypothesis was essentially investigated with events of short-time
scale subjective durations (e.g., in the time scale of tens to hun-
dreds of milliseconds, Eagleman and Pariyadath, 2009). There is
not enough evidence to indicate that similar mechanisms come
into play in duration judgments at longer time scales while certain
principles observed at brief time scales appear to hold at longer
ones. Furthermore, these models have not to date investigated
emotional stimuli. Future studies should determine their validity
in wider ranges of duration and for the specific case of emotion.
In conclusion, this study shows that content modulates time
perception in the visual modality. Interestingly, our results suggest
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a dissociation in the content effect on timing: relative overestima-
tion of all content-bearing pictures for short durations (2 s) and
delayed effect of emotion at 4 s, alongside less precision in the tem-
poral judgment of emotional pictures, whatever their duration.
This double susceptibility of timing toward emotion should be
taken into consideration in future studies.
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